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This article presents policing challenges of investigating, 
evidencing and prosecuting organized cybercriminals for the 
crimes committed using cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. A set of 
best practices is discussed to tackle these challenges in real world 
investigations. This work is a result of collaboration with a number 
of stakeholders the policing and judicial ecosystem with the 
objective of investigating and prosecuting the new generation of 
organised cybercriminals. Concrete scenarios of using Bitcoins in 
a range of cybercrimes were developed as part of this project and 
the devices were analysed to extract evidence to assist prosecution 
of organised cybercriminals. We have also presented our return of 
experience for various stages of digital forensics analysis of devices 
used in Bitcoin transactions.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cryptocurrencies [1] such as Bitcoins [2] were designed to 
facilitate global purchases without any central control nor any need 
to disclose personal information [3]. Although transactions are 
recorded in Blockchain [4] and their integrity could also be 
verified. However, details of sender and receiver could not be 
extracted if ‘private key’ is not known to the investigators. 
This idea of unregulated universal currency has a number of fiscal 
challenges notably the volatility of its value [5]. However, from the 
policing point of view, these currencies have become the premier 
choice of the cybercriminals who can misuse the anonymity 
provided by these currencies for the transactions to support their 
underworld businesses [6]. A number of high-profile Ransomware 
and Terrorist attacks have found trail of cryptocurrencies [7-8]. 
These are very sensitive cases where victims are scary of their 
public image, business interests, etc. [9-10]. This situation is 
exploited by the criminals and the use of cryptocurrencies provides 
them ideal shelter behind the intrinsic anonymity of these 
currencies [11-14]. 
In the rest of this article, we first present the problem statement of 
this work in Section 2. In Section 3, we present a range of digital 
forensic analysis challenges of investigating crimes where Bitcoins 
are used. This work is a part of collaborative project with the other 
stakeholders including law enforcement and prosecution service. A 
number of scenarios are built to reflect real-life situations where 
organised cybercriminals take advantage of the virtual world to 
operate without leaving easy of find traces. These scenario are part 
of the case study presented in the Section 4 where we also present 
our return of experience for conducting digital forensic analysis and 
best practices to get through its various challenges. A pragmatic 
discussion is made in the Section 5 on the holistic view of Cyber 
investigations of Bitcoins in the light of our experience in this 
project. Finally some conclusions are drawn in the Section 6 
together with the perspectives and future directions of this work. 
 
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The major problem faced by a number of businesses nowadays is 
to maintain their image of a ‘trustworthy enterprise’ that is capable 
of protecting its assets and can be considered by its partners and 
customers as reliable entity [15]. Therefore, even if an organization 
is attacked by Cybercriminals, the first priority of the management 
is to ensure that the security breach is not made public. In the case 
of Ransomware, they are even reluctant to inform the law-
enforcement and prefer to pay hefty amount to the Cybercriminals 
to ensure that their public image is not distorted. The same situation 
happens in other cases such as sextortion [16]. This situation goes 
in favour of the Cybercriminals as they not only gain illicit money 
but their trade becomes more and more durable over the time that 
provide them the opportunity to even expand their activities. This 
is a very challenging situation for the law enforcement and they are 
now supporting research in the area of Cryptocurrencies forensics 
to get operational solutions for the investigations, evidencing and 
prosecuting organized cybercriminals; and therefore give 







3 CRYPTOCURRENCIES FROM THE 
POLICING POINT OF VIEW 
Cryptography is designed to protect information from the malicious 
entities. The same technique could be used by the malicious entities 
to protect their activities from the eyes of law enforcement. 
Policing of encrypted information and communication is always 
challenging especially when some robust encryption is used. A 
robust encryption may not be hard to break but it is time and 
resource consuming that not only drains considerable amount of the 
available resources of the law enforcement but also provides 
criminals sufficient time to escape. This is a major reason for 
regulating information and communication products that use 
encryption by a number of countries to ensure their law 
enforcement agencies have vital access to potential criminal 
activities. An example is the concern of several governments that 
encryption technology used by BlackBerry to ensure secure 
communications with its devices makes it difficult to monitor them. 
However, this case was comparatively much simpler than 
cryptocurrencies as governments could negotiate with a tangible 
entity – BlackBerry Limited (former Research in Motion) to gain 
access to their encryption keys by offering them the carrot of 
operating in their countries [17]. There is no similar central figure 
in the case of cryptocurrencies that could be reached out by the 
governments with a carrot and stick.  
The core design of these currencies such as Bitcoin is to liberate 
them from the regulatory authorities to ensure speedy and hassle-
free transactions in real-time. So there is no controller of these 
transactions who could be asked to cooperate with the law 
enforcement agencies to entertain request for access to transactions 
data. This situation implies that the only viable solution for policing 
cryptocurrencies is to use technical solutions to monitor their 
transactions. The challenges include decryption techniques and 
ultra-high efficiency to match the speed of the peer-to-peer 
transactions. Moreover, the scale of these transactions due to 
increasing popularity of these currencies [18] is another challenge 
for the policing of cryptocurrencies. 
On the reactive side of investigations, law enforcement can use the 
similar technique as Cloud forensics, where it is almost impossible 
in most of the cases to have access to Cloud resources, the 
investigators analyse terminal devices to gain access to user data on 
the Cloud. However, it is not very straight forward comparison as 
most of the Cloud terminal devices have local folders that 
synchronise their contents with the Cloud to provide a better user 
experience independent of any connectivity issue. Device(s) use by 
Bitcoin user contain Wallet which is in reality a folder and with the 
user private key, investigators can have access to the transaction 
details. But unlike Cloud terminal devices could be imaged even if 
their user are not cooperating; whereas, access to Bitcoin’s user 
private key is essential for decoding the transaction details. 
Moreover, there are very limited option on the proactive side of 
investigations, as intelligence may have considerable number of 
false positives and false negatives that will also put pressure on the 
law enforcement resources due to higher number of false positives; 
and there will be the risk of criminals evading scrutiny due to higher 
number of false negatives. 
4 CASE STUDY 
We have used a number of real life scenarios to observe the peculiar 
challenges of investigating, evidencing and prosecuting organised 
cybercriminals. These scenarios covered a range of cybercrimes 
such as sextortion and dark web purchases. Research 
considerations for these scenarios were harmonised to work on the 
common challenges. These scenarios are executed in the real-life 
by using Bitcoins. The devices involved in these scenarios are 
analysed to solve the jigsaw puzzle of investigations. 
We have summarised these scenarios in this section and some 
details of the digital forensic investigations are presented together 
with the challenges and best practices developed to get through 
them.  
4.1 Sample Scenarios 
One of the scenarios for this work is about the use of Bitcoins in a 
sextortion case. In this scenario, the victim met a member of 
cybercriminal gangs on a dating website. Their initial exchanges 
were on the messaging service of that website and after some time 
they started communicating via Skype. After building-up further 
confidence, the exploiter managed to get some intimate pictures 
and videos of his victim. He then asked his victim to give him some 
money as he is having financial troubles and because his bank 
account is blocked due to overspending, it should be given to him 
as Bitcoins. With the passage of time, these requests became 
blackmailing tool – sextortion. Finally the victim decided to contact 
the law enforcement to end her ordeal with the obvious risk that her 
pictures and videos could be published online. 
In this scenario, the law enforcement has one cooperating party – 
the victim, whose electronic devices could be analysed for further 
details and passwords could be shared with the investigators. The 
analysts got the name of the dating site and consequently it’s 
hosting information. They also get other information such as Skype 
id and email address of the cybercriminal. These information could 
be used to identify the IP address from where the person is usually 
connected. Moreover, she has provided access to her Bitcoin Wallet 
and the BTC address of the cybercriminals where the Bitcoins were 
sent. This helped in resolving the provenance issues of Bitcoin 
forensics. 
In a more complicated scenario, a law enforcement may not have a 
cooperating party who can provide some key information to lead 
investigations. We consider a scenario where law enforcement 
receives intelligence about a person who is allegedly producing 
counterfeit payment cards. Due to the high credibility of this 
intelligence report, a warrant is executed at the suspect’s home 
address and a number of devices are seized including an embossing 
machine, a card reader, and several counterfeit payment cards. 
From the preliminary inquiry, the investigators discovered that 
Bitcoins are used in this trade. The criminal gang is using Dark Web 
to purchase equipment and raw material using Bitcoins. The prices 
of counterfeit cards are also charged in Bitcoins. 
What makes this scenario complicated is that first of all, the 
detection phase requires rigorous monitoring of the cyberspace 
which is resource-intensive and time consuming. Moreover, it has 




that law enforcement is alerted when some relevant information is 
discovered during another investigation of similar or different 
nature. In these circumstances, the pace of investigations is greatly 
affected by the level of cooperation from the suspected criminals. 
4.2 Digital Forensic Analysis 
We have applied industry standard digital forensic methodologies 
in analysing a range of devices used in these scenarios by using 
state of the art technologies.  
We used more classical investigation approach for the first scenario 
(sextortion) and obtained the following information from the 
victim’s devices: 
1. Details of the dating website where the victim met the 
criminal. 
2. Skype username and email address of the criminal.  
3. Bitcoin Address of the criminal that he gave his victim 
for sending him Bitcoins 
4. Bitcoin Wallet signed up by the victim. 
 
Address of the criminal could be traced through law enforcement’s 
request for data to the service providers. Some of the operational 
challenges of accessing this data and extracting criminal’s address 
are summarised in the following subsection together with the best 
practice employed to get through these constraints. 
Access to the criminal’s Bitcoin address is also possible when he is 
arrested as this information was obtained during the investigation. 
This information also provides details of the places where the 
Bitcoins are used. These could be cascading activities that can lead 
to further information about the gang’s activities. 
For the second scenario, the role of the digital forensic analysis is 
more crucial as almost every information needs to be extracted 
from the confiscated devices. Evidently, the seizure of embossing 
machine, blank cards and a card reader provides credible hint. But 
they don’t constitute a smoking gun for prosecuting the arrested 
person. The first preference of a digital forensic analyst is to find 
Bitcoin Wallet that is used to pay for the dark web shopping. 
Access to further details of the Bitcoins will depend on the access 
to this Bitcoin Wallet. If the arrested person is cooperating then a 
considerable manual work could be avoided otherwise, this is a 
very hectic investigation. 
In this scenario, the criminal used TOR Proxy Browser and 
always used Public WiFi in coffee shops for the Internet access. 
Moreover, the laptop was purchased by cash. He also purchased the 
Bitcoins in cash at a Bitcoin ATM in the City Centre. This shows 
the highest level of protective measures these criminals use to cause 
enormous delays in investigations even if they are flagged by the 
law enforcement agencies. We describe the operational challenges 
of recovering this information in the following subsection together 
with some best practices employed in this investigations. 
4.3 Challenges and Best Practices 
The very first challenge of digital forensic analysis is to ensure 
access to the entire dataset including those segments that are stored 
online. If the service hosting company is not based locally then it is 
difficult for the law enforcement agencies to get requested access 
to data even if the company is based in a country signatory of some 
mutual cooperation agreement for the exchange of criminal data. 
Moreover, a company may not be based in UK even if it has a 
website in the .co.uk domain. Its hosting servers could be based in 
another country and applications (and their data) could be owned 
by a different company in a different country. 
We had to deal with this situation in the first scenario of this project 
where the dating website was outside UK and would not comply 
with a request for data by a UK law enforcement agency. Therefore, 
we had to extract data from other sources notably email and Skype. 
Criminals are aware that their activities will be investigated one day 
and therefore they are using more and more sophisticated anti-
forensic techniques such as the criminal in this scenario used a VPN 
(Virtual Private Network) connection so as to hide his location even 
if his connection IP address is shared by the email service provider 
with a law enforcement. Moreover, he chose a VPN provider that 
didn’t retain logs.  
In this scenario, the goldmine was the IP address from where the 
Skype account was registered. This real IP address resolved to its 
account holder whose address was identified to execute a police 
warrant. This also helped recover access to the criminal’s Bitcoin 
account and provided an insight into how he spent these Bitcoins 
for further investigations. 
The second scenario required more intensive digital forensic 
analysis to find sound evidence for prosecution. Windows Registry 
analysis was needed to unveil web search history as well as 
temporary internet files. However, the starting point was to find 
Bitcoin wallet folder. A Bitcoin wallet is created with a randomly 
generated address. This Bitcoin address is encoded by using a 
specific scheme called Base58Check [19]. This scheme uses 
numbers and alphabets (both upper and lowercase) except 0 (zero), 
O (uppercase o), I (uppercase i), and l (lowercase L). So the sum of 
26 uppercase letters, 26 lowercase letters, and 10 digits is 62. When 
these 4 exceptions are deducted, the result is 58. Rosetta code [20] 
repository provides Bitcoin address validation script in python that 
implements Base58Check scheme. BTCscan [21] has implemented 
this code. This Python script requires raw forensic image of a 
device in .dd format. This has to be considered if instead of drives, 
only .E01 image files are provided for analysis. 
BTCscan is a simple, efficient and very useful tool for analysing 
Bitcoin activities. It allocates a memory cache for loading the 
image file. This makes the program execution efficient; however, 
it can also be a bottleneck if a large hard drive is analysed. It only 
works on the image file. Therefore, we cannot use it directly on a 
hard drive connected via write-blocker. There are plenty of 
possibilities that could be explored to get through these 
shortcomings of BTCscan to breakup large image’s .dd files into 
smaller sections, but it could be time consuming and tedious. In 
other words, for smaller drives, BTCscan remain the most powerful 
tool for the extraction of Bitcoin artefacts. 
Bitcoins purchased from ATM machines may also provide 
considerable information about the buyer if their devices are made 







Cryptocurrencies forensics require close cooperation between 
digital forensic analysts and members of different organizations in 
the policing and judicial ecosystem to successfully investigate and 
prosecute organised cybercriminals. Criminals take advantage of 
the user-friendly nature of cryptocurrencies; whereas, the technical 
complexity of investigating crimes involving these 
cryptocurrencies and resulting delays provide enough space to the 
criminals to change their cyber hideouts. Moreover, these delays 
threaten the victims with reputation damages that exacerbate the 
situation to the extent where they may prefer to pay ransom, remain 
silent, and even withdraw their complains to the law enforcement 
and refuse to cooperate with the prosecution. All of these 
eventualities go in the favour of organised cybercriminals and 
encourage their business model. Sharp rise of cybercrimes such as 
ransomware shows the advantageous position of cybercriminals 
[22].  
There are some misconceptions about the nature of these attacks 
and the preliminary steps to be taken when a cybercriminal is 
asking for ransom in cryptocurrencies. One of such misconception 
is that cybercriminals create an encrypted container where the files 
are moved and then the container is locked and files from their 
original location are deleted. These deleted files should be 
retrievable by using any of the digital forensic data recovery tool 
such as EnCase or FTK. This situation delays the investigation 
cycle as analysts are tasked to create forensic image of the victim’s 
hard drive and use some digital forensic tool to recover the original 
files. These assumptions could be true in the early days of 
ransomware with CryptoLocker [23] where even rebooting a 
Windows PC is safe mode could help recover the files. However, 
during the last couple of years, attackers have considerably 
improved their methods. Now they can even exploit security 
vulnerabilities to take over their victim’s computer instead of 
relying on phishing spams or social engineering techniques to gain 
admin access to their target computers. Moreover, they no longer 
delete/move any file. They are simply able to encrypt files thanks 
to their admin access on their victim’s computer. 
There are often incidents where victims never get back their files 
even after paying the ransom [24]. They can provide details of the 
transaction to the law enforcement for further investigation. 
However, if they preferred to avoid contacting law enforcement in 
the first instant, there are the chances that they will remain reluctant 
even when the attackers don’t honour their commitment to provide 
them access key to their files when ransom is paid. 
Quantum computing [25] is emerging as powerful contender to 
decrypt cryptocurrencies with their ultra-high computing power; 
however, we need to develop some powerful (and perhaps power 
hungry) algorithm(s) that can be used by these computers to decrypt 
these currencies in reasonable time. 
6  CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
The use of digital forensics in the lifecycle of organised 
cybercrimes is very challenging as the investigators have to not 
only confront with the resourceful gangs of cybercriminals but also 
to cope with the core technical issues of the cryptocurrencies which 
at the moment go in the favour of cybercriminals. We have closely 
worked with the stakeholders of the investigation lifecycle to 
develop best practices to tackle the challenges of investigating, 
evidencing and prosecuting organised cybercriminals. We have 
used both commercial industry standard tools for the acquisition 
and analysis of hard drives and also open source scripts to address 
specific issues of investigations. Our work was based on Bitcoins. 
Our approach may need adaptation if some other cryptocurrency is 
used by the cybercriminals. We have found that digital forensic 
analysis of machines infected by ransomware attacks is 
comparatively easier than digital forensic analysis of Cloud based 
storage from the point of view of having the opportunity to access 
resources. However, more powerful decryption algorithms and 
computing power is needed to execute them. 
This is a relatively new area and therefore has a lot of opportunities 
besides a range of challenges. The ever increasing computing 
power of the analysis tools is a good news. However, more rigorous 
research is also needed in the development of new algorithms to 
decrypt provenance of cryptocurrencies and other parameters. It 
will be challenging for the governments to bring legislations to 
regulate the use of cryptocurrencies. However, some global 
mechanism to monitor the flow of cryptocurrencies, similar to 
SWIFT [26] in regular banking transactions will not only help 
monitoring the flow of capital across borders but also provide 
useful information to the law enforcement for investigations. 
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